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 The Senate Reference did not provide an ideal 
situation for clarifying the nature and limits of the 
power of constitutional reform in Canada. The 
facts gave the Court no choice but to recognize the 
fundamental role that the Senate plays in the Ca-
nadian constitutional order, and therefore to place 
some of its main features outside the scope of sec-
tion 44 of the Constitution Act, 1982, even if they 
ran contrary to basic democratic values. For exam-
ple, in order to explain that the implementation of 
consultative elections would alter the constitution’s 
basic structure, the Court was forced to construe in 
a negative light the prospect of a democratically le-
gitimate Senate. In this paper, rather than attack 
or defend bicameralism, we will argue in favour of 
attributing a democratically reconstituted Senate 
with the primary responsibility of reviewing the 
constitutionality of legislation (as opposed to acting 
as a chamber of “sober second thought” with re-
spect to the policy decisions of the House of Com-
mons). Such an approach, we suggest, would aug-
ment the overall democratic legitimacy of the con-
stitutional order. 
Le Renvoi relatif à la réforme du Sénat 
n’était pas l’occasion idéale pour la Cour suprême 
de clarifier la nature et les limites des pouvoirs en 
matière de réforme constitutionnelle. La Cour 
n’avait d’autre choix que de reconnaître le rôle es-
sentiel que joue le Sénat dans l’ordre constitution-
nel canadien, et donc mettre certaines de ses carac-
téristiques essentielles à l’abri de la procédure de 
modification de l’article 44 de la Loi constitution-
nelle de 1982, même si ces caractéristiques sont en 
conflit avec les valeurs démocratiques fondamen-
tales. Par exemple, pour expliquer en quoi un ré-
gime d’élections consultatives transformerait la 
structure fondamentale de la Constitution, la Cour 
a dû décrire de façon négative l’idée d’un Sénat élu 
démocratiquement. Dans cet article, plutôt que 
d’attaquer ou défendre le bicaméralisme, les au-
teurs plaident en faveur d’un Sénat démocrati-
quement constitué et dont le rôle principal serait 
d’examiner la constitutionnalité des mesures légi-
slatives (et non simplement porter un « second re-
gard attentif » sur les projets et décisions de la 
Chambre des communes). Ils estiment qu’une telle 
approche favoriserait la légitimité démocratique de 
l’ordre constitutionnel dans son ensemble. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2871579 
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 The Senate Reference1 did not provide an ideal situation for clarifying 
the nature and limits of constitutional change in Canada. The facts gave 
the Supreme Court little choice other than to recognize the fundamental 
role that the Senate plays in the Canadian constitutional order and, 
therefore, to place some of its main features outside the scope of unilateral 
action by the federal government under its exclusive authority to “make 
laws amending the Constitution of Canada in relation to the executive 
government of Canada or the Senate and House of Commons.”2 Perhaps 
more controversially, in order to prevent the implementation of consulta-
tive elections that, according to the judges, would fundamentally alter the 
architecture of the constitution,3 the Court was forced to construe the pro-
spect of a democratically legitimate Senate in a negative light. This con-
struction seems a somewhat perverse and unappealing way to proceed, 
especially if the constitution is intended to promote, not stymie, democrat-
ic improvement. 
 Of course, the democratic deficiencies of the Canadian Senate (for ex-
ample, non-elected chamber, non-proportional representation of the prov-
inces, long appointments, historical property qualifications, et cetera) are 
not unique; they have been widely shared by upper houses in other juris-
dictions. Like the Supreme Court, modern and contemporary defenders of 
bicameralism have nevertheless attempted (with varying degrees of suc-
cess) to present those democratic deficiencies as strengths: upper houses 
slow down the legislative process, avoid sudden legislative changes, pro-
tect otherwise potentially underrepresented minorities, force legislators to 
have second thoughts, and so on.4 Despite these efforts, many jurisdic-
tions during the twentieth century radically reformed their upper houses 
or moved toward different forms of unicameralism, and in a number of 
countries (such as the United Kingdom and Ireland), discussions of this 
nature continue. Viewed in this light, Canada might be considered to be 
on a backward slide toward a less, not more, democratic scheme of gov-
ernment. 
 In this essay, we provide both an explanation for the existing state of 
affairs and a basis for doing something about it. The main challenge is to 
think in a less blinkered way about what counts as democratic in regard 
to the role and composition of the Senate as well as the larger constitu-
                                                  
1   Reference Re Senate Reform, 2014 SCC 32, [2014] 1 SCR 704 [Senate Reference]. 
2   Constitution Act, 1982, s 44, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 
[Constitution Act, 1982]. 
3   See Senate Reference, supra note 1 at para 54.  
4   See Bruce Ackerman, “The New Separation of Powers” (2000) 113:3 Harv L Rev 633. 
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tional processes at play. In so doing, it might become possible to diagnose 
the causes of the present malaise and to offer a more satisfying prognosis 
for a future and healthier role, if any, for the Senate in the Canadian body 
politic. A commitment to democracy is professed to be the bedrock of Can-
ada's constitutional arrangement. Our proposal takes the commitment 
more seriously than most commentators or scholars do. So reinvigorated, 
Canadian democracy might be better placed to improve, if not resolve, its 
long-running drama over the Senate’s continuing existence and perfor-
mance. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Part I considers the current state of 
the debate after the Supreme Court’s decision in the Senate Reference. 
Part II compares the Canadian approach to constitutional amendments to 
arrangements and practices present in other jurisdictions. Part III builds 
on those comparative insights and argues that constitutions with similar 
amendment rules tend to use those rules to protect and promote basic 
democratic principles. While Canada’s constitution does not explicitly 
adopt this approach, the Supreme Court has followed a similar route 
through the recognition of democracy as one of the underlying principles 
on which the constitution rests. In that sense, the decision in the Senate 
Reference may have underplayed the role that democracy plays in the Ca-
nadian constitutional order. Part IV identifies what we consider to be the 
main problematic features in the structure and operation of the current 
Senate. In Part V, we advance a substantive proposal that would address 
those problems: reconceiving the Senate as constitutional reviewer. 
I. The Impasse 
 The Senate is the upper, but less influential, chamber of Canada’s bi-
cameral Parliament. It has been the subject of countless plans and reform 
proposals about its membership, its appointment process, its powers, and 
its democratic legitimacy.5 While these transformative efforts have been 
initiated and motivated by a diverse range of vested interests and political 
ideologies, Canada’s Senate remains largely unchanged in its role or 
structure. Consequently, while there is an apparent consensus in support 
of the need for change, there is a complete lack of agreement on the direc-
tion that any change should take and the process by which it might be 
achieved.6 All in all, Canada’s Senate remains unreformed because it is 
                                                  
5   For a discussion of historical Senate reform proposals, see Robert A MacKay, The Unre-
formed Senate of Canada, revised ed (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963). 
6   Some argue that the objective of an improved Senate may be achieved without constitu-
tional reform. See e.g. Serge Joyal, ed, Protecting Canadian Democracy: The Senate You 
Never Knew (Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003). 
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neither sufficiently loved nor sufficiently unloved; it is tolerated, but not 
embraced. 
 Efforts to change or abolish the Senate have been a staple feature of 
Canada’s political and constitutional landscape since even before its crea-
tion in 1867. As far back as the 1840s, when the Senate was the Legisla-
tive Council of the Province of Canada, politicians and pundits have 
locked horns over its role and its composition. Indeed, in 1885, the ruling 
Liberal Party adopted, but failed to implement, a policy demanding that 
senators be elected. For the next hundred years or so, debate spluttered 
and surged over the nature of the appointment process and whether the 
Senate should simply be abolished. However, in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, the debate over the possibility of electing senators was rekindled; 
Trudeau’s efforts to implement a national energy policy alienated the 
western provinces and galvanized them to push for a so-called Triple-E 
Senate – elected (by local citizens), equal (between provinces), and effective 
(having genuine power).  
 Following the failed Charlottetown Accord in the early 1990s, the Tri-
ple-E initiative lost its lustre, but the federal Conservative government 
persevered with the idea of a reformed Senate, especially the plan to elect 
senatorial candidates. However, not only did this run into strong opposi-
tion from both the New Democratic Party and the Bloc Québécois, but 
pressing questions were raised generally about the constitutionality of 
any proposed reforms. Whatever the Harper government’s motives, a ref-
erence was presented to the Supreme Court to clarify the constitutional 
status of different proposals. The case was heard in late 2013 and a judg-
ment was rendered at the end of April 2014. In short, the Supreme Court 
nixed the realistic prospect of any Senate reform by the federal govern-
ment without provincial sign-on. Barring an extraordinary degree of fed-
eral–provincial consent to push through institutional reforms or to amend 
the constitutional provisions for amendment, Senate reform is now con-
sidered off the political agenda for the immediate future. 
 The basic thrust of the Supreme Court’s decision in the Senate Refer-
ence is straightforward. In its unanimous decision, the Court decided that, 
although the Senate is a federal institution, any significant changes to 
it—tenure, consultative elections, abolition, et cetera—cannot be achieved 
by the federal government through section 44 of the Constitution Act, 
1982, which allows the Canadian Parliament to unilaterally amend the 
Constitution of Canada. “The Senate,” stated the Court, “is one of Cana-
da’s foundational political institutions. It lies at the heart of the agree-
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ments that gave birth to the Canadian federation.”7 Consequently, as 
changes to the Senate “engage the interests of the provinces,” 8  such 
changes must be approved in line with the constitutional requirements for 
change that demand, to varying degrees, provincial participation and ap-
proval. Outright abolition, the most radical change, requires unanimous 
federal–provincial consent,9 because to allow otherwise would be to flaunt 
and “alter our constitutional architecture ... by removing the bicameral 
form of government that gives shape to the Constitution Act, 1867.”10 
 While this outcome has significant constitutional logic and authority, 
its democratic justification is uncertain and mixed. On the one hand, the 
decision can be seen as advancing democracy by ensuring that important 
and democratically represented interests (i.e., those of the provinces) can-
not be affected without their political involvement and formal consent. On 
the other hand, it can be seen as thwarting the democratic process by pre-
venting a duly elected federal government from changing its own institu-
tions in order to make them more democratic and representative. Of 
course, the role and position of the Supreme Court itself can be viewed in 
similar mixed terms, both as an integral feature of Canada’s mode of 
democratic governance, and as an unrepresentative and unelected institu-
tion within that governmental structure. 
 Against this backdrop, it becomes difficult to make any hard and fast 
criticisms of the Supreme Court’s decision or to defend viable recommen-
dations for major Senate reform in the name of democratic advancement 
in the Canadian polity. One route might be to take seriously the Supreme 
Court’s observations about the Senate’s fundamental nature and “role as 
a complementary legislative chamber of sober second thought.”11 Howev-
er, instead of attributing to the Senate the task of evaluating the desira-
bility of the policies advanced by particular bills, we propose to reconceive 
it as an entity called to reflect (in an attitude of sober second thought) on 
the constitutionality of those bills. This proposal might be thought of as 
both a too limited (for supporters) and too expansive (for abolitionists) un-
derstanding of the Senate’s possibilities and powers. Nevertheless, when 
advocated in the name of enhanced democratic governance, this under-
                                                  
7   Senate Reference, supra note 1 at para 1. See also Reference Re Authority of Parliament 
in Relation to the Upper House (1979), [1980] 1 SCR 54, 102 DLR (3d) 1; Reference Re 
Bill C-7 Concerning the Reform of the Senate, 2013 QCCA 1807, 370 DLR (4th) 711. 
8   Senate Reference, supra note 1 at para 72. 
9   See Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 2, s 41(e). 
10   Senate Reference, supra note 1 at para 97. 
11   Ibid at para 70. 
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standing can serve as the basis for the Senate becoming a fuller and more 
empowered partner in federal government. 
 It must be emphasized to those democratic purists, be they populist 
reformers or abolitionists—who maintain that any change must satisfy 
the most demanding tenets of the democratic ideal—that the best should 
not be the enemy of the good. While an elected Senate might well be the 
best democratic circumstance or outcome (if there is to be any Senate at 
all), there is no reason why important recalibrations cannot be made with-
in the existing constitutional arrangements and parameters. This is a de-
cidedly second-best solution. But there is no all-or-nothing dilemma de-
spite the heated protestations of critics of the Supreme Court’s Senate 
Reference. Smaller and less ideal changes can be effected that might ad-
vance the democratic agenda more than resigned or bitter acquiescence to 
the status quo. As with any effort at political change, it is important to 
start where things presently stand and seek change from there: An exas-
perated resignation to the status quo or a high-minded but naïve idealism 
is no substitute for a principled pragmatism.  
 As noted earlier, rather than attack or defend bicameralism, we will 
argue in favour of attributing to a democratically reconstituted Senate the 
primary responsibility of reviewing the constitutionality of legislation. 
Such an approach, we suggest, would serve at least two main functions 
that would augment the overall democratic legitimacy of the constitution-
al order. First, it would increase deliberation by elected officials on consti-
tutional issues, potentially decreasing the instances of judges striking 
down legislation. Second, it would reduce the political costs of using the 
override provisions of the Charter12 by making clear that there is a disa-
greement on the meaning of rights, rather than a rights-violating legisla-
ture overriding the decisions of a rights-protecting Court. Before exploring 
that approach in more detail, we will first look at the constitutional pro-
cesses at play in the Senate reform debate from a comparative perspec-
tive. 
II. Of Tiered Amendment Rules 
 The Constitution Act, 1982 does not have a single rule for constitu-
tional amendments. This is not unique to Canada, but is a feature com-
mon to many constitutions. For example, Article V of the Constitution of 
the United States provides at least four methods to produce a valid consti-
tutional amendment. According to the “least demanding” one, two-thirds 
of the members of each house of Congress may propose an amendment, 
                                                  
12   Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 33, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. 
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which would become valid upon ratification by the legislatures of three-
fourths of the states. The most demanding method requires amendments 
to be proposed by a special national convention called by Congress on ap-
plication of two-thirds of the states and ratified by special conventions on 
three-fourths of the states.13 Not surprisingly, this method has never been 
used. 
 With the only exception being the rule that depriving a state from 
equal representation on the Senate requires the consent of that state 
(which could be seen as involving a fifth method for amending the consti-
tution),14 those multiple processes are content-independent: each of them 
can be used to make any textual change in the 1787 Constitution regard-
less of how fundamental that change is.15 Some United States constitu-
tional lawyers, however, have argued that the substance of an amend-
ment has Article V implications. For example, William Harris maintains 
that in order to correctly amend the US Constitution, one must first ex-
amine the substance of the amendment to be adopted, and then determine 
which of the methods provided by Article V is to be used.16 In Harris’s 
view, if an amendment fundamentally alters the way in which political 
power is exercised, it must be adopted by one of the most demanding 
methods of change (which, in the US constitutional imagery, are seen as 
having a closer connection to the people). 
 While one cannot find textual support for Harris’s position in the US 
Constitution, the amendment rule contained in the Canadian Constitution 
Act, 1982 is in a certain way consistent with his view. The Constitution 
Act, 1982 establishes five different amendment methods. It is premised on 
                                                  
13  The other two methods involve two-thirds of the members of each house of Congress 
proposing an amendment to be ratified by special conventions on three-fourths of the 
states, and a special national convention called by Congress on application of two-thirds 
of the states, whose proposals are ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the 
states. 
14   It has been argued that to the extent that altering one state’s representation in the 
Senate also deprives all states of “equal Suffrage in the Senate”, the unanimous consent 
of all states is required for such a change. See Richard Albert, “Constructive Unamend-
ability in Canada and the United States” (2014) 67 SCLR (2d) 181 at 196ff; Sanford 
Levinson, “The Political Implications of Amending Clauses” (1996) 13:1 Const Com-
mentary 107 at 122. 
15   Early in the twentieth century, the US Supreme Court rejected the idea that some con-
stitutional changes are so fundamental that they fall outside the scope of Article V. See 
Leser v Garnett, 258 US 130, 42 S Ct 217 (1922); Coleman v Miller, 307 US 433, 59 S Ct 
972 (1939). 
16   See William F Harris II, The Interpretable Constitution (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1993) at 193–201. See also Elai Katz, “On Amending Constitutions: 
The Legality and Legitimacy of Constitutional Entrenchment” (1996) 29:2 Colum JL & 
Soc Probs 251. 
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the idea that the more fundamental a change is, the more stringent the 
requirements of the method used to produce it should be.17 For example, 
the Constitution Act, 1982 identifies a number of changes (like those per-
taining to the office of the Queen, to the use of the English or French lan-
guages, and to the composition of the Supreme Court) that must be adopt-
ed by the strictest procedure possible (i.e., the unanimous consent of fed-
eral and provincial legislatures). Such a level of agreement would argua-
bly indicate a higher degree of popular support. Other changes of a less 
fundamental nature may be adopted by less demanding mechanisms (i.e., 
mechanisms requiring a lesser degree of federal–provincial consent).  
 This approach is not unique either. The Constitution of Spain, adopted 
in 1978, also exhibits a tiered amendment rule. Most amendments to the 
constitutional text can be achieved through the general procedure estab-
lished in Article 167, which places the amending power in a supermajority 
of both legislative houses. If requested by a tenth of the members of one of 
the chambers, ratification by referendum is necessary. Nevertheless, 
changes that involve the “total revision” of the constitution, or that affect, 
for example, the form of government (i.e., the monarchy), the official lan-
guage, the indivisibility of the Spanish nation, or recognized rights and 
liberties, must be first proposed by two-thirds of both chambers. The 
chambers are then dissolved, a new election called, and the newly elected 
legislators must approve the change by a two-thirds majority. Finally, the 
change in question comes into effect only if ratified by the people in a ref-
erendum. 
 The Canadian and Spanish amendment rules protect what has fre-
quently been termed the constitutions’ basic structure by making the 
adoption of certain amendments particularly difficult. Some courts in oth-
er jurisdictions have attempted to create an even stronger protection for 
those basic constitutional elements by making them legally unamenda-
ble.18 For example, in Kesavananda Bharati v. Kerala,19 a case that dealt 
with a series of land reforms that affected property rights, the Supreme 
Court of India famously determined that, while Parliament had the power 
to amend any constitutional provision, it could not alter the basic struc-
ture of the constitution. According to the different concurring opinions, 
the basic structure included the principle of constitutional supremacy, the 
                                                  
17   See Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 2, ss 38–49. See also Richard Albert, “The Ex-
pressive Function of Constitutional Amendment Rules” (2013) 59:2 McGill LJ 225 at 
250. 
18   For a discussion of the implications of this approach for a democratic conception of con-
stitutionalism, see Joel I Colón-Ríos, Weak Constitutionalism: Democratic Legitimacy 
and the Question of Constituent Power (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2012). 
19   Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala, 4 SCC 225, [1973] 60 AIR 1461 (India Sup Ct). 
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republican form of government, federalism, the welfare state, individual 
liberty, and secularism.20 Different versions of this doctrine have been 
adopted by courts in countries as dissimilar as Colombia and Belize.21 
III. Of Basic Structures and Democracy 
 A constitution’s basic structure is the legal manifestation of the fun-
damental commitments on which the constitutional regime rests. It is 
thus not surprising that Canada, Spain, and India, as constitutional de-
mocracies, have similar ideas about what constitutes their constitutions’ 
basic structure. However, Spain and India, as well as other jurisdictions 
that have more recently adopted constitutions with tiered amendment 
formulas, such as Bolivia and Ecuador,22 have included as part of their 
constitutions’ basic structure—either through judicial decisions or 
through explicit constitutional provisions—the protection of fundamental 
rights. In those countries, amendments that tend to abolish fundamental 
rights are extremely difficult to bring into existence, or simply inadmissi-
ble. Since respect for many of those rights is generally understood as a 
precondition for democracy,23 the purpose of that approach is best under-
stood as an attempt to prevent democracy from being weakened through 
formal constitutional change.  
 Put differently, these legal orders treat democracy as an integral part 
of the constitution’s basic structure. Any attempt to debilitate this ar-
rangement through a change in the constitutional text would be as seri-
ous (from a constitutional perspective) as an alteration of a federal system 
or of a monarchical or republican form of government. The amendment 
                                                  
20   It is interesting to note that the Colombian Constitutional Court has expressed, in 
obiter that the abolition of one of the legislative chapters would amount to the creation 
of a new constitution and therefore is outside the scope of the amending power. See Cor-
te Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Bogatá, 30 July 2008, Sentencia C-757/08 (Co-
lombia). 
21   See e.g. Carlos Bernal, “Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments in the Case 
Study of Colombia: An Analysis of the Justification and Meaning of the Constitutional 
Replacement Doctrine” (2013) 11:2 Intl J Constitutional L 339; Arif Bulkan, “The Lim-
its of Constitution (Re)-making in the Commonwealth Caribbean: Towards the ‘Perfect 
Nation’” (2013) 2:1 Can J Human Rights 81. See also Yaniv Roznai & Serkan Yolcu, 
“An Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment: The Turkish Perspective: A Com-
ment on the Turkish Constitutional Court’s Headscarf Decision” (2012) 10:1 Intl J Con-
stitutional L 175. 
22   See Constitución de la República del Ecuador, 20 October 2008 (Ecuador), as amended, 
art 442; Constitución Política del Estado, 7 February 2009 (Bolivia), art 411. 
23   The idea that respect for certain rights is necessary for democracy to exist does not nec-
essarily commit one to a particular view of the judicial role. See e.g. Jeremy Waldron, 
Law and Disagreement (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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rules contained in the Constitution Act, 1982 do not formally protect de-
mocracy in this way. However, there are some textual indications of the 
fundamental role that democracy plays in the Canadian constitutional or-
der, such as the fact that the rights listed in sections 3 to 5 of the Charter 
(under the heading “Democratic Rights”) are placed out of the scope of the 
legislative override provision. Perhaps more importantly, the Supreme 
Court of Canada has recognized democracy (together with federalism, re-
spect for minorities, and constitutionalism and the rule of law) as one of 
the underlying principles that form part of the polity’s basic constitutional 
structure.24  
 In the Secession Reference, the Court stated that “it would be impossi-
ble to conceive of our constitutional structure without [these principles]. 
[They] dictate major elements of the architecture of the constitution itself 
and are as such its lifeblood.”25 Taking into account those principles, the 
Court must interpret the constitution “with a view to discerning the struc-
ture of government that it seeks to implement.”26 On the principle of de-
mocracy, the Court expressed that it “has always informed the design of 
our constitutional structure, and continues to act as an essential interpre-
tive consideration to this day” and “[i]n institutional terms, democracy 
means that each of the provincial legislatures and the federal Parliament 
is elected by popular franchise.”27 Of course, democracy will sometimes 
need to be understood in light of the other underlying principles, as in the 
Secession Reference with respect to the principle of federalism.28 
 In light of this approach, it would be expected that the extent to which 
a proposed amendment runs contrary to one or more of those underlying 
principles (without at the same time promoting another) would have an 
effect on the way the Court interprets the amendment rule. For example, 
in the event of doubt as to the applicable amendment process, the adop-
tion of an amendment that alters Canada’s federal structure would likely 
have to take place through one of the most stringent procedures. On the 
contrary, if a proposed amendment would promote one of those principles 
(again, without negatively affecting another), one would expect the court 
                                                  
24   See Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at para 49, 161 DLR (4th) 385 
[Secession Reference]. 
25   Ibid at para 51. 
26   Senate Reference, supra note 1 at para 26. 
27   Secession Reference, supra note 24 at paras 62, 65. See also OPSEU v Ontario (AG), 
[1987] 2 SCR 2, 41 DLR (4th) 1 (in which the court stated that “the basic structure of 
our Constitution, as established by the Constitution Act, 1867, contemplates the exist-
ence of certain political institutions, including freely elected legislative bodies at the 
federal and provincial levels” at 57). 
28   See Secession Reference, supra note 24 at paras 66, 88. 
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to err on the side of making the change more easily achievable. This 
would not seem to be a controversial position to take, since a constitution-
al order that rests on a number of underlying principles would always be 
presumed to be striving toward them. In terms of Senate reform, this is 
particularly relevant for the proposal about consultative elections; the 
word “consultative” should be stressed, as it must be remembered that 
what was at issue was not the prospect of real democratic elections, but a 
system in which senatorial nominees would be endorsed by the popula-
tions of the provinces that decided to hold elections and in which the 
Prime Minister would remain able to ignore those nominees when making 
a recommendation for appointment.29  
 As the Supreme Court recognized, such an arrangement would not re-
quire a formal change in the constitutional text. 30 The Governor General 
would still appoint senators according to section 24 of the Constitution 
Act, 1867.31 It would nevertheless indirectly affect the convention that the 
Prime Minister recommends Senate nominees to the Governor General 
because the former would be required to consider—although not being 
bound by—the result of provincial elections.32 However, such a constitu-
tional reality (i.e., non-binding provincial elections for senatorial candi-
dates along with a situation in which the Prime Minister takes into ac-
count, without necessarily following, the result of those elections) could in 
any case operate as an informal practice or understanding as to the ways 
in which Senators should be appointed; this could happen even in the ab-
sence of federal legislation.33 If such a practice (which may evolve into a 
convention) existed, it would have to be tolerated by the courts because it 
would not involve any taint of unconstitutionality.  
 For example, it would be constitutionally valid for one province (or for 
a number of provinces) to legislate so as to create a system of non-binding 
elections for senatorial candidates and communicate to the federal gov-
                                                  
29   See e.g. the process set out in Bill C-20, An Act to Provide for Consultations with Elec-
tors on their Preferences for Appointments to the Senate, 2nd Sess, 39th Parl, 2007 (first 
reading 13 November 2007) and Bill C-7, An Act Respecting the Selection of Senators 
and Amending the Constitution Act, 1867 in Respect of Senate Term Limits, 1st Sess, 
41st Parl, 2011 (first reading 21 June 2011) [Bill C-7].  
30   See Senate Reference, supra note 1 at para 52. 
31   Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 24, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, 
No 5 [Constitution Act, 1867]. 
32   Contra Mark D Walters, “The Constitutional Form and Reform of the Senate: Thoughts 
on the Constitutionality of Bill C-7” (2013) 7 JPPL 37. 
33   For a discussion, see generally Fabien Gélinas & Léonid Sirota, “Constitutional Con-
ventions and Senate Reform” (2013) 5 Revue québécoise de droit constitutionnel 107. 
See also Patrick J Monahan, Constitutional Law, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2002) at 
488. 
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ernment the election results (as has been the law in Alberta since 1989).34 
In light of this, it is difficult to understand why a similar state of affairs 
cannot be achieved through federal legislation. And it is not that informal 
practices that may evolve into conventions cannot be subject to judicial 
invalidation. For example, there could never be a convention that the fed-
eral government will not allow members of a particular minority to exer-
cise the right to vote. Any attempt by the government to engage in such a 
practice in the first place would be invalidated by the courts, because the 
practice itself (however informal) would be unconstitutional. Naturally, a 
piece of legislation that attempts to achieve the same result would be in-
valid as well. But if a particular governmental practice is constitutional, 
then how could it be unconstitutional to transform it into law through sec-
tion 44 of the Constitution Act, 1982?35  
 Moreover, consultative elections would arguably promote the principle 
of democracy without significantly affecting any of the other underlying 
principles of the Canadian constitutional order. The Prime Minister, for 
example, would be free to ignore the provincial election of senatorial can-
didates that have shown disrespect for minority rights, and the role that 
the Senate plays within the federal governmental structure would be 
maintained (for example, provincial interests would still be represented in 
the same proportion).36 In this respect, it is constitutionally odd that the 
Court rendered the establishment of a system of consultative elections 
that would increase the democratic legitimacy of a government institution 
so difficult to achieve. From a comparative constitutional law perspective, 
it may even be seen as a constitutional aberration. In fact, if it had been 
                                                  
34   See Senatorial Selection Act, SA 1989, c S-11.5, as re-enacted by RSA 2000, c S-5. 
35   Or, for that matter, under the general law-making power under section 91 of the Consti-
tution Act, 1867. Perhaps the fact that, at least under Bill C-7, the Prime Minister 
“must” consider the names of the elected candidates when making a recommendation 
for appointment (supra note 29, s 31) is what puts consultative senatorial elections out-
side the scope of section 44. But in the Senate Reference case, the emphasis was not on 
the language of Bill C-7, but on the fact that after a provincial election takes place, the 
Prime Minister would be politically obligated to take the results into account (see Sen-
ate Reference, supra note 1 at para 62). The same political obligation would arguably ex-
ist if provincial elections took place in the absence of federal legislation. 
36   Bypassing the amendment rule—for example, allowing a constitutional change that 
clearly requires provincial consent to be adopted unilaterally by the federal govern-
ment—in the name of democracy would clearly run contrary to the principles of consti-
tutionalism and federalism. But this was not the case in the Senate Reference, as there 
were reasonable doubts as to the applicable amendment rule—at least with respect to 
the proposal about consultative elections (see supra note 1 at paras 51–53). It is also 
possible that some provincial premiers oppose an elected senate because a province-
wide elected senator would risk displacing the premier as the province’s voice in Otta-
wa, but such a political displacement would not directly alter the federal structure of 
the government. 
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the other way around (i.e., if the Canadian Senate was already an elected 
body and Parliament had attempted to transform it into a non-elected en-
tity), the Supreme Court not only would have been justified in reading the 
amendment provisions of the Constitution Act, 1982 as requiring the most 
demanding process (i.e., federal-provincial unanimity), but perhaps to 
disallow the amendment altogether (deciding, as other jurisdictions have 
done, that the constitution has a core that can only be changed through 
an exercise of the original constituent power).37 
IV. Upper Houses and Democratic Legitimacy 
 Upper houses have a bad reputation among democrats. Historically, 
they have been assigned the role of preventing government from degener-
ating into a system that protects the interests of the many over those of 
the few.38 Upper houses were usually created to play a balancing role; 
they were conceived as an aristocratic element that would ensure that the 
system did not turn into an absolute democracy. Accordingly, their mem-
bers invariably belonged to the upper classes of society; this explains the 
names “upper house” and “lower house.”39 They were seen as providing 
members of the propertied elites with the opportunity to protect their own 
interests, which frequently ran contrary to those of the general popula-
tion.40 In fourteenth-century England, for example, the division between 
                                                  
37   See Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 2, s 41. For a discussion, see generally Colón-
Ríos, supra note 18. 
38   See generally George Tsebelis & Jeannette Money, Bicameralism (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1997) at 17–26. 
39   See Meg Russell, “What are Second Chambers for?” (2001) 54 Parliamentary Affairs 
442 at 443. 
40   It is interesting that in the Senate Reference, the Supreme Court expressed that “the 
removal of the real property requirement (s 23(3), Constitution Act, 1867) would not al-
ter the fundamental nature and role of the Senate” and therefore could be unilaterally 
removed by the federal parliament (with a partial exception related to Québec’s elec-
toral law) (Senate Reference, supra note 1 at para 91). The same was stated with respect 
to the net worth requirement: “There is nothing in the material before us to suggest 
that removing the net worth requirement would affect the independence of senators or 
otherwise affect the Senate’s role as a complementary legislative chamber of sober sec-
ond thought” (ibid at para 88). It is of course true that these qualifications do not play 
any significant role today, but they certainly did in the nineteenth century and probably 
for a good part of the twentieth. As in other upper houses around the world, they served 
as a guarantee that the Senate would be controlled by a “sober” upper propertied class 
that could serve as a counterpart to the more “passionate” and popular lower house. If 
the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the Senate Reference had been applied in the late 
nineteenth century, the removal of the property and net worth requirements would 
have probably been seen as attracting some of the more stringent amendment formulas. 
Such a decision would not have been appropriate today because views have since 
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the House of Lords and the House of Commons was based on a distinction 
“between those who represented themselves and those who represented 
their communities.”41 
 Nowadays that approach has been largely abandoned. Instead, de-
fenders of bicameralism usually argue that the advantage of an upper 
house is that it “slows down the legislative process, renders abrupt change 
difficult, forces myopic legislators to have second thoughts, and thereby 
minimizes arbitrariness and injustice in governmental action.”42 But the 
old, elite-based understanding is still reflected in the form that bicameral-
ism assumes in jurisdictions that have retained largely unreformed upper 
houses. For example, it is still common to find unelected, or partially une-
lected, upper houses, such as the Canadian Senate, the Irish Seanad, and 
the British House of Lords. Nevertheless, most upper houses are now 
elected, even if they were originally composed of appointed members.43 
This process toward the democratization of upper houses is exemplified by 
the reform of Legislative Councils in Australian states during the twenti-
eth century.44 
 Partly because of their dubious democratic legitimacy, upper houses 
are generally less prestigious and powerful than their elected counter-
parts. However, the fact that they lack democratic legitimacy is some-
times seen as a virtue rather than a vice. For example, Mughan and Pat-
terson maintain that “for parliamentary governments to create directly 
elected upper houses would be potentially to create a whip for their own 
backs.”45 “Direct election,” they argue, “would endow senates with the 
same democratic legitimacy as lower houses and, especially when con-
trolled by a different partisan majority, would turn them into a competi-
tor” for the political authority of lower chambers.46 Or, in the words of the 
Supreme Court of Canada: “[t]he proposed consultative elections ... would 
weaken the Senate’s role of sober second thought and would give it the 
      
changed. But why can we not also say that views about non-elected senators as a fun-
damental feature of the upper house have changed too? 
41   Tsebelis & Money, supra note 38 at 23. 
42   William H Riker, “The Justification of Bicameralism” (1992) 13:1 Intl Political Science 
Rev 101 at 101. 
43   See Tsebelis & Money, supra note 38 at 47. 
44   See generally Bruce Stone, “Bicameralism and Democracy: The Transformation of Aus-
tralian State Upper Houses” (2002) 37:2 Australian J Political Science 267. 
45   Anthony Mughan & Samuel C Patterson, “Senates: A Comparative Perspective” in 
Samuel C Patterson & Anthony Mughan, eds, Senates: Bicameralism in the Contempo-
rary World (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1999) 333 at 339. 
46   Ibid. 
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democratic legitimacy to systematically block the House of Commons, con-
trary to its constitutional design.”47 
 While the upshot of this view is that, given their lack of democratic le-
gitimacy, upper houses would normally be very wary of interfering with 
the policy decisions of the elected house, the fact is that they sometimes 
work as a means for “slowing politics down”;48 they can delay, and some-
times block, the passage of legislation they consider undesirable. There 
are many historical examples of Conservative upper houses preventing 
the government of the day from adopting progressive measures, including 
in the United Kingdom several times during the twentieth century (situa-
tions that eventually led to major reform of the powers of the House of 
Lords).49 For these and other reasons (including their failure to play any 
meaningful role in the law-making process), the existence and nature of 
upper houses has usually been the subject of intense discussions. In some 
places, including New Zealand and Denmark, those discussions have led 
to their abolition; in others, such as Canada, France, Ireland, and Spain, 
they have resulted in different attempts at reform.50  
 It has thus been suggested that upper houses are “essentially contest-
ed” institutions, always the subject of dispute: “Many countries choose not 
to have one, others have them but then do away with them, and still oth-
ers keep them but are engaged in an apparently incessant dialogue about 
                                                  
47   Senate Reference, supra note 1 at para 60. It is worth mentioning that such a view inad-
vertently provides support not for the democratic decision-making power of the elected 
commons, but for a political community controlled by the executive. That is to say, an 
elected upper house may actually serve the purpose of ensuring that other democratic 
interests are able to act as a check on the decisions of the executive of the day (who will 
usually have significant control over the majority in the House of Commons). As Wal-
dron has put it in a different context: “I sometimes wonder, when people say how im-
portant it is for the House of Commons to retain its ascendancy in our constitution, 
whether it is really the ascendancy of an elected chamber that they want, or whether 
they really want to preserve the guaranteed ascendancy of the Crown and its ministers 
acting through their whip-based domination of the Commons” (“Bicameralism and the 
Separation of Powers” (2012) 65 Current Leg Probs 31 at 35 [Waldron, “Bicameral-
ism”]). 
48   Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Democracy Realized: The Progressive Alternative (London: 
Verso, 1998) at 213. 
49  See generally Michael Rush, “The House of Lords: The Political Context” in Paul Car-
michael & Brice Dickson, eds, The House of Lords: Its Parliamentary and Judicial Roles 
(Oxford: Hart, 1999) 7. See also Parliament Act, 1911 (UK), 1 & 2 Geo V, c 13; Parlia-
ment Act, 1949 (UK) 12, 13 & 14 Geo VI, c 103. For a recent judicial discussion of these 
Acts, see R (Jackson) v AG (HL(E)), [2005] UKHL 56, [2006] 1 AC 262. 
50   See Russell, supra note 39 at 442. 
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how they should be reformed.”51 Canada falls, of course, in the third camp. 
Under the formal constitutional arrangements in place, the Senate is a 
full partner in Canada’s bicameral system of federal governance. The only 
restrictions on the powers of the Senate are twofold. First, under the Con-
stitution Act, 1867, bills that impose taxes or appropriate public funds 
cannot be introduced in the Senate.52 Secondly, while the Senate can de-
lay the approval of a constitutional amendment that has been passed by 
the House of Commons, it cannot veto it indefinitely; the House of Com-
mons can override the Senate’s rejection of a constitutional amendment 
after a 180-day wait.53 
 However, as a less politically partisan institution, the Senate follows a 
convention whereby it plays a decidedly secondary role in the legislative 
process when compared to the more democratically authorized House of 
Commons. Accordingly, most bills arise in the House of Commons and will 
receive the approval of the Senate, with only minor amendments or 
friendly changes. Nevertheless, this state of affairs has not prevented the 
Senate from taking an active and disapproving role when it thought the 
situation demanded it.54 As revealingly described by Sir John A. Macdon-
ald (and reiterated very recently by the Supreme Court in the Senate Ref-
erence), the Senate functions as a body of “sober second-thought” that is 
intended to curb the democratic excesses of the House of Commons.55 
Even though Macdonald also maintained that the Senate “will never set 
itself in opposition against the deliberate and understood wishes of the 
people,”56 the fact is that every now and then, the Senate will challenge 
the decisions of the democratically elected House of Commons. 
 In its early years up to the mid-1920s, the Senate effectively scup-
pered government legislation on around 180 occasions. In the next sixty 
years or so up to 1987, the rate of rejection decreased and only about for-
                                                  
51   Mughan & Patterson, supra note 45 at 338 (for the term “essentially contested,” 
Mughan and Patterson cite WB Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts” (1955–1956) 
56 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 167). 
52   See Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 31, s 53. 
53   See Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 2, s 47. 
54   For a general discussion, see David C Docherty, “The Canadian Senate: Chamber of So-
ber Reflection or Loony Cousin Best Not Talked About” (2002) 8:3 J Legislative Studies 
27. 
55   Province of Canada, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates on the Subject of the 
Confederation of the British North American Provinces, 3rd Sess, 8th Prov Parl (6 Feb-
ruary 1865) at 35–36 (Attorney General John Alexander Macdonald) [Parliamentary 
Debates]. See also Senate Reference, supra note 1 at para 15 (referring to the upper leg-
islative chamber’s purpose in providing “sober second thought” on legislation adopted 
by the lower house). 
56   Parliamentary Debates, supra note 55 at 36. 
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ty-five or so of government bills in total were turned back. Since then, the 
Senate has occasionally inserted itself into high-profile and controversial 
government initiatives. For instance, in the late 1980s, it refused to pass 
the Canada–United States free trade bill and later the goods and services 
tax legislation. On both occasions, the government managed to force 
through the legislation, but only after a federal election in one instance 
and the appointment of extra senators in another. Again, in the early 
1990s, the Senate narrowly turned back government efforts to enact new 
abortion legislation following the constitutional invalidation of earlier leg-
islation by the Supreme Court. More recently, in 2010, the Senate refused 
to pass a government bill intended to regulate greenhouse gases.  
 Of course, these more vigorous and perhaps not “sober” interventions 
by the Senate have aroused controversy. They have added convenient fuel 
to the abolitionist fire. Nevertheless, the problem is not only the current 
Senate’s undemocratic nature (after all, an elected upper house with a dif-
ferent ideological composition to the government of the day that insists on 
blocking its policy decisions would probably raise a good amount of dis-
comfort, too), but the fact that it is conceived as a “legislative body of sober 
second thought”; that is to say, as an entity whose main function is to en-
gage in what the Supreme Court recently identified as “legislative re-
view.”57 Such an entity would frequently find itself in the position of disa-
greeing with the policy decisions of the other legislative chamber, and in 
some cases, be tempted to prevent those decisions from becoming law. In 
this sense, and in light of the perceived constitutional impasse created by 
the Supreme Court’s Senate Reference decision, abandoning the view of 
the Senate as a legislative chamber seems like a promising alternative.  
V. The Senate as a Constitutional Reviewer 
 The approach that we take to Senate reform (and to any other kind of 
legal or political reform) is what might be called “democratic pragma-
tism.” This approach is built on the premise that democracy is better un-
derstood as being not a ground or foundation for politics but a dynamic 
process through which politics is experienced and evaluated; the institu-
tional forms and social practices of democracy must themselves be open to 
debate and revision in line with the experience of society’s participating 
members. Such a strong approach to democracy is very strategic and po-
litical. Rather than talk in absolute terms about the overall democratic 
quality of society, it is preferable to concentrate on those measures that 
might make a society more democratic. Viewed in this way, democracy is 
not a black-and-white idea or practice; a society is not either democratic or 
                                                  
57   Senate Reference, supra note 1 at paras 63, 79 [emphasis added].  
CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE SENATE 617 
 
 
undemocratic. It is a matter of shading and degree. While it will be neces-
sary to make trade-offs within a democratic society, it is unnecessary and 
ill-advised to make trade-offs with democracy.  
 Consequently, rather than think about democracy as one particular 
thing or to evaluate a state of affairs as being democratic or not, it is bet-
ter to ask whether taking a particular step is likely to advance democracy; 
this will be a contextual and contingent assessment. As such, the type of 
democratic commitment that we defend is pragmatic and contingent ra-
ther than idealistic or absolutist. The primary considerations in any effort 
to effect change will always be: which present and realizable measures will 
best increase people’s participation and control over those institutions and 
practices that most affect their lives today? Or, which present and realiza-
ble measures will best decrease the hold that less democratic institutions 
have over more democratic institutions? It is always a contextual balanc-
ing of better or worse, not a final assessment of absolutes and ideals.58  
 While it is better that more citizens be involved more of the time than 
fewer citizens be involved less of the time, it seems counterproductive to 
deny the adjective “democratic” to a reform proposal or strategy because it 
does not involve everyone all the time. If incremental change is all that is 
viable, then doing something is better than doing nothing and capitulat-
ing to the status quo. Such an approach strongly recommends greater ef-
forts to pluralize and circulate the sites and situations in which more 
democratic—even if imperfect and flawed—interventions are encouraged. 
By being flexible and pragmatic, democrats can accept that compromise 
as well as conviction is an important quality of democratic advocacy. For 
instance, in terms of the constitutional role of the courts, no amount of in-
genious finagling can manage to square two incompatible institutional 
practices—judicial review and popular sovereignty. Indeed, judicial re-
view, as presently conceived, is anathema to the strong democrat; it is an 
elite practice that might, at best, occasionally be democratic in being for 
the people, but it can never be by the people (or else it would cease to be 
judicial review).  
 That said, any reform that moves some power away from the courts 
and toward other organs of government is to be encouraged. Our proposal 
should be understood in that vein: assigning the Senate the task of re-
viewing the constitutionality of bills proposed by the House of Commons 
with the purpose of ameliorating the democratic deficit created by the in-
stitution of judicial review of legislation, and therefore contributing to the 
overall democratic legitimacy of the constitutional order. In so doing, the 
                                                  
58   For a fuller defense of this point, see Allan C Hutchinson, The Province of Jurispru-
dence Democratized (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 7–19. 
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Senate would be acting as a chamber of “sober second thought,” not as to 
the desirability of the policies advanced in the relevant bills, but as to 
their consistency with the constitution. Of course, the line between law 
and policy is blurred. However, the important point is that the Senate 
should view itself as engaged in a traditional judicial task. 
 Such a proposal is not novel. In fact, upper houses in other jurisdic-
tions have also been assigned the task of preventing the adoption of un-
constitutional bills. For example, in France and Poland, when members of 
the upper houses believe that a bill is unconstitutional, they can seek a 
ruling from the relevant court.59 In Canada, the Senate has already en-
gaged in some forms of constitutional review, as occurred with the “Clari-
ty Bill” in the year 2000.60 
 We envision such a system as having the following features, which in 
time might evolve into constitutional conventions.61 First, bills should be 
introduced in the House of Commons, not in the Senate. This is generally 
the case today, but in a system in which the Senate’s role would be limited 
to that of reviewing the constitutionality of legislation, it is important that 
senators not see themselves as lawmakers. Second, the federal govern-
ment would make clear to potential Senate appointees that they should 
understand their function to be that of constitutional, not legislative, re-
viewers. That is to say, they are not to second-guess the policy decisions of 
the lower house, but to deliberate on the constitutionality of legislation 
and, if necessary, to formally communicate to the House their conviction 
that a particular bill appears to be contrary to a constitutional provision. 
Third, attempts should be made to compel potential senators to voluntari-
ly step down from office after a relatively short term (for example, ten 
years). 
 Fourth, even in cases in which there is a disagreement between the 
Senate and the House as to the constitutionality of a bill, the former body 
should not exercise a veto power, except perhaps in extraordinary circum-
                                                  
59   For a discussion of these mechanisms and of the general role of upper houses as organs 
of constitutional review, see generally Aisling Reidy & Meg Russell, “Second Chambers 
as Constitutional Guardians and Protectors of Human Rights” (June 1999), online: 
UCL School of Public Policy, Constitution Unit <www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/publications/unit-
publications/44.pdf >. 
60   See Docherty, supra note 54 at 36. 
61   This system may be put into practice without the need for legislation. In fact, if it was to 
be established through legislation, it is possible that its constitutionality would be put 
into question by some. Needless to say, one of the odd results of the Senate Reference is 
that some things that can be informally achieved by public officials (e.g., consultative 
elections themselves could be established by a set of informal agreements between the 
federal and provincial governments) cannot be achieved by legislation. 
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stances (for example, a House of Commons that approves a bill intended 
to result in gross human rights violations). In light of a disagreement be-
tween an elected and a formally non-elected chamber, the view of the 
elected chamber should prevail. Fifth, if senators are to continue to be ap-
pointed by the Governor General on the recommendation of the Prime 
Minister, provinces that are committed to an elected Senate should put in 
place a scheme of non-binding elections of senate nominees; the results of 
these elections would be formally communicated to the federal govern-
ment (which would then be expected to consider those results when mak-
ing appointments). A fully appointed Senate with constitutional review 
functions, after all, would be akin to an enlarged Supreme Court, which, 
in the words of Jeremy Waldron, “would be the worst possible outcome.”62 
Finally, the Supreme Court would maintain its power to strike down leg-
islation. 
 In line with the democratic ambition of this proposal, it is important to 
ensure that the Senate’s deliberations about the constitutionality of fed-
eral initiatives are themselves carried out in as thoroughly a democratic 
way as practicable. To do otherwise would not only undercut the legitima-
cy of the new role for the Senate, but also confine the structure and sub-
stance of such deliberation. The Senate must set its own agenda and de-
velop its own informing theoretical framework in determining what con-
stitutionality means and what it does and does not demand.63 In particu-
lar, it will be essential that Senate debates are not oriented around the 
Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence or even performed within 
its capacious argumentative shadow. This would compromise the whole 
democratic impetus and raison d’être of why the Senate’s institutional re-
sponsibilities should be constitutionalized. While Supreme Court juris-
prudence might be one resource to be consulted and weighed, it cannot be 
utilized as the scales of judgment: it must not dominate the discursive 
orientation and analytical approach of the Senate. This would be to throw 
good democratic money after bad constitutional money. 
 For all the democratic flaws of the Senate, its greater involvement in 
debate and decisions about the constitutionality of federal legislation 
would be preferable to present arrangements: a slightly democratic au-
                                                  
62   Waldron, “Bicameralism”, supra note 47 at 50. See also Vernon Bogdanor, “The Prob-
lem of the Upper House” in Vernon Bogdanor, Politics and the Constitution: Essays on 
British Government (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 1996) 243 at 247: “[i]f one is looking for an 
upper house with the authority to fulfil the function of constitutional protection ... the 
conclusion seems inescapable that it must be an elected body.” 
63  This, of course, is the major thrust of the academic literature of “popular constitutional-
ism.” See Larry Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judi-
cial Review (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) and Mark Tushnet, “Popular Con-
stitutionalism as Political Law” (2006) 81:3 Chicago-Kent L Rev 991. 
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thority beats a non-democratic authority. Accordingly, an expanded role 
for the Senate in the constitutional review of legislation would advance, 
no matter how incrementally and imperfectly, the commitment to demo-
cratic governance. By shifting the institutional fulcrum of constitutional 
review from the courts to a more democratically reconstituted Senate, it 
might be possible to augment the overall democratic legitimacy of the 
constitutional order. Such a reform would address, although by no means 
eradicate, the democratic failings of a society that persists in placing 
enormous power in the hands of an unelected and unrepresentative judi-
ciary. To borrow from John Hart Ely, “we may [rant] until we’re blue in 
the face” that the Senate isn’t “wholly democratic, but that isn’t going to 
make courts more democratic” than the Senate.64  
 One of the likely outcomes of this arrangement is that if the Senate 
engages in a robust and good faith deliberation about the constitutionality 
of a controversial bill, and concludes that it is consistent with the consti-
tution, it is likely that the Supreme Court will be more restrained in using 
its power to strike down federal legislation (Supreme Court review of pro-
vincial legislation would not be directly affected by this proposal). Moreo-
ver, this approach might invigorate and render more palatable the resort 
to the override provisions of the constitution. Although the Constitution 
Act, 1982 attempted to create a system of constitutional review that would 
allow Parliament to have the ultimate authority (in most cases) as to the 
validity of legislation, it is the Supreme Court, another unelected institu-
tion, which enjoys the de facto final word.65  
 The fact is that since its introduction in 1982, section 33’s notwith-
standing clause has hardly featured in the political operation of the feder-
al or provincial governments.66 While some provinces have utilized the 
                                                  
64   Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1980) at 67. 
65   Section 33 allows “Parliament or the legislature of a province” to declare “that the Act 
or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included” in section 2 
(Fundamental Rights) or sections 7 to 15 (Legal Rights) of the Charter. The Charter 
places Democratic Rights (sections 3–5) and Mobility Rights (section 6) outside the 
scope of section 33. 
66  For a recent discussion, see Rosalind Dixon, “The Supreme Court of Canada, Charter 
Dialogue, and Deference” (2009) 47:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 235. The development of a ra-
tionale for judicial review that centres on the availability of section 33 seems to be op-
portunistic at best in light of the fact that it is presently and politically unusable by the 
federal government. See Peter W Hogg & Alison A Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Be-
tween Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad 
Thing After All)” (1997) 35:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 75. For a powerful democratic critique, 
see Andrew Petter, The Politics of the Charter: The Illusive Promise of Constitutional 
Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010). Also, some commentators have be-
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override provision to insulate legislation from judicial interference, most 
have not; seven of the ten provinces and two of the three territories have 
refrained from relying upon it. Most pertinently, the federal government 
has never exercised its section 33 powers in the more than thirty years of 
its existence. This state of affairs has become politically accepted on the 
basis that the use of section 33’s notwithstanding clause is somehow un-
democratic and, therefore, illegitimate. From a democratic perspective, 
this is an entirely troublesome way of looking at matters. Section 33 is as 
much part of the constitution as any other clause. Indeed, the inclusion of 
section 33 was essential and instrumental to the adoption of the Charter.  
 Without section 33, it can be forcefully and validly argued that there 
might have been no Charter at all and even no patriation of the constitu-
tion.67 Moreover, the upshot of the condemnation of section 33 as some-
how undemocratic or even taboo is to entrench further the almost exclu-
sive authority of courts to determine whether the legislative initiatives of 
an elected Parliament are constitutional. This is tantamount to the elitist 
tail wagging the democratic dog. A more active constitutional role for the 
Senate in scrutinizing legislation would have the salutary effect of reduc-
ing the political costs of Parliament using the override provision of the 
Charter. In particular, it would work toward establishing that, when the 
constitutionality of a piece of legislation is successfully impugned by the 
courts (after having passed the Senate’s constitutional review), the use of 
the override would not be a case of a legislature insisting on violating con-
stitutional protections. Instead, it would put the focus on the fact that 
there was actually a disagreement between two organs of government—
legislature and courts—on the meaning and operation of rights.  
 In light of such explicit disagreement, it would be seen as perfectly 
reasonable that the organ with the highest degree of democratic legitima-
cy (the legislature) decide every now and then to exercise its override 
powers to have the final word. This is a more accurate and compelling un-
derstanding of how a democratic mode of constitutional authority should 
be exercised and implemented. Even among institutions acting in good 
faith, there will be ample room to agree to disagree over what best pro-
motes and achieves the ambitions of democratic governance in modern so-
ciety. Giving the Senate a role in scrutinizing legislation for constitutional 
value would open up that debate and encourage the more enlightened 
view that what democracy demands is neither fixed nor certain; the ver-
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nacular of absolutes is anathema to a democratic polity. As befits its ar-
gumentative and participatory aspirations, such a reform of the Senate 
would enhance the procedural and substantive dimensions of the demo-
cratic project.  
 Importantly, a Senate tasked with constitutional responsibility would 
not strive to replicate courts and mimic the judicial (and juristic) preoccu-
pation with establishing neutral and non-political bases for defining 
rights and legitimating their actions. Instead, it might be accepted that 
the Senate, as with all governing bodies and agencies, will be involved in 
the same game—delivering substantive answers to concrete problems. In 
doing so, while no one institution will have a lock on political judgment as 
to the best thing to do, all institutions’ decisions will be evaluated in 
terms of the value choices that they make and the contribution that their 
decisions make to advance substantive democracy in the here and now.  
Conclusion 
 In this essay, we have sought to make the best of a bad job. The Su-
preme Court’s interpretation of the Canadian constitution has left com-
mitted democrats with few genuine options. However, rather than throw 
up their hands in resignation, it behooves them to take short-term 
measures that might open up a space for more effective and wide-ranging 
future interventions. At the heart of our proposal is the basic democratic 
belief that the appropriate inquiry in a strong democracy is not to ask 
whether particular policy-making bodies have acted politically and, there-
fore, improperly, but whether the political choices that they have made 
serve that society’s democratic agenda. There are no right answers; poli-
cies and programs will always be a contested and contestable issue. The 
most that democrats can do is to ensure that the sites for debate and deci-
sion making are as open, multiple, and representative as possible. An ef-
fort to constitutionalize the Senate is one place to begin. 
    
 
